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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action brought by the plaintiff-respondent
to enforce a promissory note.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The trial court without a jury, awarded a judgment to
plaintiff in the amount of $5,500.00 plus $1,181.35 in interest,
court costs of $37.80 and attorneys' fees in the sum of $2,227.11
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff-respondent seeks affirmance of the judgment
of the trial court.
STATEMENTS OF FACTS
Respondent accepts the statement of facts of appellant
with the following clarifications and additions:
Plaintiff, Mary Buzianis, transferred certain real property to Beneficial Homes Incorporated for the development of a
subdivision. In consideration thereof defendant, Ronald Gibb,
personally executed a promissory note on the 14th day of January,
1971, agreeing to pay plaintiff the sum of $7,500.00, at the
rate of $500.00 per lot as each lot was sold from East Highlands
Subdivision #4.
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Plaintiff's suit was brought against Beneficial Homes
Incorporated and Ronald Gibb, personally, alleging that the
defendants had defaulted in making payments on said written
instrument according to the tenor thereof, in that defendants
had transferred said lots from Beneficial Homes Incorporated to
Lawrence D. Gibb without making the $500.00 per lot payment
thereon and thereby owed the amount of $5,500.00 on said written
instrument and further defendants defaulted in making interest
payments on said written instrument according to the tenor thereof and owed interest at the rate of six (6) percent per annum
and reasonable attorneys fees as provided by the promissory
note.(Exhibit A attached to Complaint).

The defendant, Ron

Gibb, prepared and filed his own answer to plaintiff's Complaint
on the 13th day of August, 1974.
At the initial hearing on June 9, 1975, Ron Gibb appeared personally and represented himself.(Tr. 2, June 9, 1975 hearing) . The parties entered a stipulation that judgment be granted against the defendant, Ron Gibb, and that said judgment was
not to be entered until July 14, 1975.(Tr. 2&3, June 9, 1975
hearing).
The stipulated purpose for the delayed entry of judgment
was to afford the defendant, Ron Gibb, an opportunity to produce
evidence that he was entitled to additional credits against the
amounts prayed for by the plaintiff.(Tr. 2&3, June 9, 1975 hearing) . This stipulation was accepted by the Court and judgment
was granted, but not allowed to be entered until July 14, 1975.
(Tr. 3&4, June 9, 1975 hearing).
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On July 14, 1975, the parties again appeared in Court
and the defendant, Ron Gibb, presented to the Court a series
of copies of checks he alleged to have been payments to Mary
Buzianis on the above described promissory note.(Tr. 2, July
14, 1975 hearing).

These copies were not received by the Court

as exhibits or evidence, but the plaintiff did admit receipt
of several of these checks, and the same were only considered
upon plaintiffs admission of their receipt and proper credit
having been given therefore.
Check #1212, in the amount of $2,139.00, was acknowledged
as a down payment for the purchase of plaintiff's real property
East Highland Subdivision #4.(Tr. 3, July 14, 1975 hearing).

The

check was dated in numerals and appeared to counsel for plaintiff
that the date could possibly be September 14, 1971. However,
the check was stamped paid by the bank upon which it was drawn
January 15, 1971, and therefore the date of said check was probably January 14, 1971, the date of the promissory note and
confirms that said check was received as a down payment on the
land.

There never was a finding by the Court that this check

was received on September 14, 1971, and the plaintiff never admitted receiving it on that date.
Copies of four other checks numbered B4985, B4986, B4705
and B4987 in the amount of $500.00 each and each being designated
East Highland y/4 were admitted by plaintiff to have been received
and credited to the above described promissory note.(Tr. 2&3,
July 14, 1975 hearing).
The remaining copies of checks entitled East Highland #3
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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were rejected by the plaintiff as evidence of payments on the
above entitled promissory note for East Highland #4.(Tr. 3, July
14, 1975 hearing).

Of the checks presented by defendant for

credit plaintiff acknowledged five as having been received, four
of which were in the amount of $500.00 each and one in the amount
of $2,139.00 as down payment.

The trial court inquired if proper

credit had been given for these checks that plaintiff acknowledged
receipt of.

Plaintiff answered affirmatively.

The court asked

defendant if there were any questions about that.

The defendant

replied MThe five he went through?" The Court - "Have you been
given credit for those?11

The defendant - "Yes."(Tr. 3, July 14,

1975 hearing).
The Court at the second hearing granted the defendant,
Ron Gibb, an additional week to procure admissible evidence, and
Ron Gibb was told to appear on the 21st day of July, 1975, at
9:00 o'clock.(Tr. 8&9, July 14, 1975 hearing).
At the third hearing on July 21, 1975, the defendant,
Ron Gibb, failed to appear and the court allowed entry of the
previously granted judgment without any further restrictions on
execution.(Tr. 2, July 21, 1975 hearing).
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXCLUDED DEFENDANT'S EVIDENCE
OF DAMAGES.
Pursuant to the stipulation of the parties a judgment was
granted on June 9, 1975, as prayed for in plaintiff's Complaint.
(Tr. 2, June 9, 1975 hearing).

The parties also stipulated that
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the judgment would be entered on July 14, 1975, provided that no
documentation at that time could be presented by the defendant
showing that defendants were entitled to additional set-offs.
On July 14, 1975, the defendant, Ron Gibb, appeared in
Court and presented to the plaintiff copies of ten checks he
alleged to have been payed to the plaintiff on the promissory
note.(Tr. 2, July 14, 1975 hearing).

The plaintiff acknowledged

that four of the checks in the amount of $500.00 each and designated East Highland #4 had been received and credited to the promissory note at issue, for a total credit in the amount of
$2,000.00.(Tr. 2&3, July 14, 1975 hearing).
The plaintiff also acknowledged receipt of a check for
$2,139.00 as the initial down payment on East Highland #4.(Tr.
3, July 14, 1975 hearing).
The defendant was specifically asked by the Court if he
had been given credit for the above five described checks, and
he responded that he had.(Tr. 3, July 14, 1975 hearing).
The remaining copies of checks presented by the defendant,
Ron Gibb, were rejected by the plaintiff as evidence of payments
on the promissory note for East Highland #4.(Tr. 3, July 14, 1975
hearing).

The plaintiff alleged that these checks were for other

transactions, such as East Highland #3 and not East Highland #4.
The Court also refused to accept these copies of checks
as evidence qualifying for credit, since it found the unauthenticated copies of checks lacking an endorsement on the reverse side
and in the words of the Court

f,

There is nothing on the check that

indicates what it was for at all-nothing at all."(Tr. 5&6, July 14,
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1975 hearing).

The trial Court refused

therefore to accept

and give credit for the remaining checks since they failed to
show on their face that they were in payment of East Highland
#4V-

The Court after refusing to accept these copies as
evidence told the defendant that he had the burden of presenting admissable evidence.(Tr. 4, July 14, 1975 hearing).

The

burden of proof was shifted to the defendant at the initial
hearing when he stipulated to the judgment.(Tr. 3, June 9, 1975
hearing).

The parties at that initial hearing agreed that the

judgment would not be entered for five weeks allowing the defendant time to present evidence that he was entitled to additional
credits against the judgment.(Tr. 3, June 9, 1975 hearing).

The

defendant himself agreed that he had the burden of procuring
evidence f?of any payment, or partial payment on the amounts due
under the note" to prevent the judgment from being entered. (Tr. 3,
June 9, 1975 hearing).
At the second hearing the defendant also attempted to
introduce a disbursement record for East Highland #3, that was
prepared by Commercial Security Bank.(Tr. 7&8, July 14, 1975
hearing).

The defendant alleged that Commercial Security Bank

had recorded payments on this ledger that he had authorized to
be paid towards East Highland #4.(Tr. 8, July 14, 1975 hearing).
However, the Court refused to accept this evidence.

The Court

stated that before this kind of evidence would be admissable
the defendant would have to "subpoena someone from the bank and
have him testify".(Tr. 8, July 14, 1975 hearing).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The defendant

then stated he would subpoena someone from the bank, whereupon
the Court gave the defendant, Ron Gibb until July 21, 1975, at
9:00 a.m. to bring forth a witness or further admissible evidence.
(Tr. 9, July 14, 1975 hearing).

On July 21, 1975, the defendant

failed to appear at the scheduled time and the Court allowed the
previously granted judgment to be entered.(Tr. 2, July 21, 1975
hearing).
The plaintiff continually objected to the introduction of
all checks and ledgers dealing with East Highland #3, since the
promissory note of defendant was entitled East Highland #4.(Tr.
3&4, July 14, 1975 hearing).

These were the same copies of checks

and ledgers that were excluded by the court at the trial, and in
its findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Court said they
were Mnot entitled to credit against said note due to incomplete
documentation".
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT GAVE THE DEFENDANT CREDIT FOR A
$2,139.00 CHECK WHICH THE PLAINTIFF ADMITTED RECEIVING AS A DOWN PAYMENT.
At the hearing on July 14, 1975, the plaintiff admitted
that defendant's copy of a check for $2,139.00 had been received
by the plaintiff, and that it was the "down payment on the land,
East Highland #4M.(Tr. 3, July 14, 1975 hearing).
The defendant was asked if he had been given credit for
this and four other checks and he responded that he had.(Tr. 3,
July 14, 1975 hearing).

The Court in its findings of fact and

conclusions of law referred to this check as "'No. 1212, drawn on
the account of Beneficial Homes Incorporated, in the amount of
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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$2,139.00 [and] was the down payment for purchase of said property and previously credited to defendants prior to execution of
the note11.
Defendant-appellants in their brief state that check
No. 1212 for $2,139.00 was dated September 14, 1971, and therefore
could not have been a down payment on the promissory note executed
on January 14, 1971. However the trial court never referred to
the date of the $2,139.00 check and as was previously stated in
the Court's findings of fact, that the check, Numbered 1212 for
$2,139.00 was the down payment for purchase of said property and
was previously credited to defendants prior to execution of the
note.
The only reference to the date on check No, 1212 was by
the plaintiff's attorney, Mr. Watson, when he was attempting to
read the copy of that check, on Page 3 of the July 14, 1975
transcript, as follows:
"Then, your Honor, there is a check there, dated
looks like September the 14th of 1971, it's in the
amount of $2,139.00, which is a down payment on the
land, East Highland #4."
It is clear from this statement that the date on the
unauthenticated copy was not clearly legible.

It is also clear

that if the plaintiff had not acknowledged receipt of this
$2,139.00 check as the down payment on East Highland #4 it would
never have been entertained by the Court.
The defendant, Ron Gibb, at the trial never questioned
the fact that he had been given credit for the $2,139.00 as a
down payment on East Highland #4 and never questioned the proposi
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that it was received by the plaintiff prior to the execution of
the promissory note on January 14, 1971. He in fact admitted
having received credit for it.(Tr. 3, July 14, 1975 hearing).
It is plaintiff-respondent?s contention that the illegible
numerical date of said check unsuredly referred to as September
14, 1971 was in fact January 14, 1971, the same date the promissory note as issue was executed.

However the only findings of

fact referred to by the Court concerning this check were that
check No. 1212 was a down payment and previously credited to
defendants prior to the note's execution.
It is a very tenuous position to attempt to overturn the
lower Court's findings based upon an unsure reading of one digit
of a numerical date of a copy of a check, contrary to all other
evidence presented to the Court and the defendant having admitted
in court to having received credit for said check.
POINT III.
THE STIPULATION BETWEEN PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL AND DEFENDANT SHOULD BE GIVEN FULL EFFECT.
The defendant-appellant, Ron Gibb, acted as his own
attorney at every stage of the lower court proceedings, including the filing of his own Answer, setting the trial date and
appearing at two separate hearings.
The defendant, Ron Gibb, specifically agreed at the initial
hearing that a judgment be granted against himself and in the
amounts prayed for in plaintiff's Complaint.
In Deseret Savings Bank v. Walker, 78 Utah 241, 2P.2d
609 (1931) this Court concluded that a stipulation entered at
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trial in open court between a layman and an attorney was valid
and effective as against the lay person.

This finding was based

on the fact that the layman there was, "a man of affairs with
no little experience in business matters11.
In the present case the defendant, Ron Gibb, was in the
business of purchasing property and developing it into subdivisions
This Court's declarations in Deseret Savings Bank v. Walker, supra,
apply equally as well to the defendant-appellant in the present
case, when the Court stated:
"Nothing is made to appear that he was either ignorant or inexperienced or that any advantage was taken
of him, or that he did not fully comprehend the full
meaning of his stipulation and the implications necessary arising therefrom. He made no application to
the trial court for permission to withdraw his stipulation, and before the trial court made no effort to
repudiate it nor to be relieved from it on the ground
of misapprehension or mistake. There is no reason why
the ordinary rules applicable to stipulations of this
sort should not be applied and given full effect.
Id., at 251.
The defendant, Ron Gibb, also added this statement concerning his competency at the second hearing when he said:
"The reason I am here by myself is that I am
competent counsel."(Tr. 6, July 14, 1975 hearing).
The trial court was very generous in giving the defendantappellant five weeks to produce evidence of payments made to
plaintiff as provided by his stipulation.

When he failed to do

so he was again given another additional week to subpoena witnesses or produce admissible evidence.

The defendant responded by

failing to appear at the third scheduled hearing.

There is

nothing whatsoever in the record to indicate that the defendant
did not understand the implications of his actions and therefore
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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his stipulation must be given effect.
POINT IV.
THE AWARD OF ATTORNEYS1 FEES OF $2,227.11 WAS PROPER.
Plaintiff's suit is an action to recover money due under
a promissory note.

The amount due and owing on the note at the

time the initial Complaint was prepared was $5,653.22, plus
$1,028.13 interest, or a total of $6,681.35.

The note also pro-

vided that the defendant, Ron Gibb, would also pay a reasonable
attorney's fee upon default if necessary for collection.

Plain-

tiff's Complaint alleged that a reasonable attorney's fee was
$2,227.11 or thirty-three percent of the amount due and owing.
The stipulation of the parties entered into on June 9,
1975, was for "the amounts prayed for according to the prayer
thereof".(Tr. 2, June 9, 1975 hearing).

It is true that this

stipulation itself did not refer to specific amounts, but only
referred to the prayer in plaintiff's Complaint.

In addition

to not specifically referring to attorney's fees, it did not
refer to the amount of interest due, the costs of court, or the
principal amount due and owing.

The parties were well aware of

these specific amounts as prayed for in plaintiff's Complaint,
and when the Court accepted the stipulation of the parties it
accepted a stipulation as to the amount of reasonable attorney's
fees.

It is clear that a stipulation as to attorney's fees is

sufficient to base a judgment thereon.

In F.M.A. Financial

Corporation v. Build, Inc. 17 Utah 2d 80, 404P.2d 670 (1965)
this Court stated the rule regarding the awarding of attorney's
fees, as follows:
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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"It is fundamental that the judgment must be based
upon findings of fact, which in turn has been followed
by this Court and other jurisdictions in regard to
awarding attorney's fees. Because both judges and
lawyers have special knowledge as to the value of legal
services, this is not always required to be proven by
sworn testimony. It is sometimes submitted upon stipulation : as to amount; or that the judge may rlx"~it on
the basis of his own knowledge and experience; and/or
in connection with reference to a Bar approved schedule.M
The present judgment for attorney1s fees was upon stipula-

tion of the parties, reviewed by the Court and never thereafter
questioned by the defendant-appellant.

It represented plaintiff's

preparation for three separate hearings and cannot be declared
clearly unreasonable.

CONCLUSION
The trial court properly excluded defendant's proferred
copies of unendorsed checks, when there was no evidence adduceable
on their faces to show that they were in payment of the promissory note for East Highland #4. The Court also properly excluded
a ledger book prepared by Commercial Security Bank when the
defendant attempted to introduce it without supporting testimony
from a bank employee.

Defendant} Ron Gibb, was given credit

for $2,139.00 as a down payment received by plaintiff prior to
the execution of the promissory note and in fact agreed he had
been properly credited.
The defendant was a competent businessman self-declared
competent counsel and therefore there is no reason that his stip-
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ulation for judgment including attorney's fees should not be
given its full effect.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 10th day of March, 1976.

EDWARD A. WATSON
Tooele County Courthouse
Tooele, Utah 84074
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent
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